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PREFACE
[A]s I walk through the world, I bring into focus certain things
which are meaningful, and others are by degrees less in focus,
dependent upon their meaningfulness in terms of what I'm doing,
to the point where there are certain things that are totally out of
focus and invisible. We organize our minds in terms of this
hierarchical value structure, based on certain ideas about meaning
and purpose and function. 1
For a long time, legal theory has been used to achieve generality. By
rising above particulars, theoreticians have been able to focus upon
comprehensive abstract ideas, like justice, equality, and the social good.
Lawyering theory takes a different path.
In this collection of articles, scholars in law, anthropology,
psychology, and sociology examine the ways in which legal meanings are
made and distributed in everyday legal practices. Particular attention is
given to what goes on at the local level. How do practicing attorneys,
government officials, clients, witnesses, judges, and mediators think and
talk about the law in particular contexts? What meanings does their
discourse reflect and generate? And why does a particular legal meaning,
or one kind of legal narrative, come to triumph over another at a
particular time and place in a given set of circumstances?
In short, a lawyering-theory approach invites us to study concrete
particularities. It does not join in (even if it does not reject) the effort to
construct comprehensive abstract models as points of departure for
analyzing what the law is or should be. If there are constructs to uncover,
a lawyering theorist might say, let us look first to see how they are
operating in practice. Let us examine the numerous acts of representation
and interpretation that occur everyday in the life of lawyers and others
with whom they interact. There is much to discern in those acts: implicit
meanings lay embedded, and are often veiled, within them. Legal and
factual interpretations come so quickly to hand that we often experience
them as indistinguishable from reality or consciousness itself. It is as if no
interpretation occurred at all, as if what we see, and the way we see it,
what we understand and the way we understand it, were unmediated,
direct, coming from "out there." But closer study suggests otherwise.
Inevitably, acts of perception and conceptualization are acts of
interpretation as well.
1. LAWRENCE WEcHSLER, SEEING Is FORGETTI
THE NAME OF THE THING ONE
SEEs: A LIFE OF CONTEMPORARY ARTIST ROBERT IRWIN 108 (1982).
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Taking this insight as a point of departure, the articles that follow set
out to refresh our perception and understanding of law in everyday life.
These articles examine the concepts, beliefs, and feelings that may be
causally involved in the legal and lay actor's actions and reactions to one
another and to the world around them. In this way, lawyering theory
reflects a mode of inquiry that is currently emerging in fields such as
cultural and, cognitive anthropology and psychology. One of the main
objectives of this approach is to explore how legal meanings are brought
"on and off line" or are kept more or less permanently repressed.' An
effort is also being made to examine the social, political, and
psychological processes that may account for how and why this meaning
selection process occurs.
As cognitive psychologist Jerome Bruner notes in his article for this
volume, 4 the narrative construction of reality is pervasive, and it is very
much a part of the lawyering process. Whether it is a matter of drawing
upon "the great theme[ ] of protecting hearth and home against
intruders" 5 or setting one metaphor against another in an effort to contrast
ships "in dry dock" with vessels "ready for sea," 6 the challenge judges
and lawyers face remains the same: how shall the legal story be told?
According to Bruner, there is much to consider in responding to this
question. For example, one's choice of narrative form or genre, the
images one selects, and the "golden thread" of plot by which one makes
2. See Richard K. Sherwin, Lawyering Theory Symposiun:An Overview, What We
Talk About When We Talk About Law, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rv. 9, 15 n.11 (1992).
It should be noted here that the cognitive approach reflected in these pages deals

with the way humans construct meaning in concrete interpretive practices and symbolic
activities. This insistence upon meaning as the central concept of psychology first
emerged in the late 1950s, in opposition to the once dominant behavioral
("stimulus/response") model of human psychology. There is similar resistance afoot
today in reaction to recent efforts by cognitive scientists to reduce our acts of meaning
to something quantifiable, a matter of "information processing." Attempts to create
artificial intelligence by mechanically duplicating human "cognitive programs" are
illustrative of this type of reductionistic, computative approach to cognition. See
generaly JEROME BRUNER, ACrs OF MEANINO 1-32 (1990) (providing a general history
and update of the "cognitive revolution" in psychology). For a recent philosophical
critique of cognitive and linguistic reductionism, see HILARY P TNAM, REPRESENTATION
AND REA= (1989).
3. Richard Shweder & Maria A. Sullivan, Cultural Psychology: Who Needs It?, 44
ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 497 (1993).
4. Jerome Bruner, A Psychologist and the Law, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 173

(1992).
5. Id. at 180.
6. Id.
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one's story cohere-all of these considerations figure in the task of
rendering a legal narrative believable.
Drawing from her various field studies, anthropologist Sally Engle
Merry observes in her article that "law and society are mutually defining
and inseparable." 7 According to Merry, the way in which one learns to
think and talk about a problem helps to determine what that problem is
about and how it should be treated. Whether the controversy involves,
say, a legal right or entitlement warranting legal intervention, or is
deemed a personal dispute, a "mere" failure of communication that should
be worked out between the contending parties, depends upon the legal
consciousness of the person describing the "relevant" events and the way
in which the legal system names and discusses the matters at issue.
Merry's mediation example in the article that appears in this volume
illustrates this observation by showing how a particular court, by altering
its discourse, secures a particular legal outcome. More specifically, here
we see how a shift from rights talk to moral or therapeutic discourse
simultaneously establishes the limits of the law and the mistaken
expectations of a particular party.
Sociologist Kim Lane Scheppele makes a similar point in her
examination of some hidden common-sense assumptions about8
"truthfulness" that operate in sexual-harassment cases. In her article,
Scheppele shows that a common-sense repudiation of "delayed" or
"revised" stories, as told by victims of sexual harassment, reflects deeply
ingrained socially constructed habits of belief about what truth is supposed
to look like. In this common-sense view, because truth is simple, seeable,
and "out there," there is no reason why we cannot get it at once.
Accordingly, any delay or subsequent change in one's initial account of
an event often comes to be seen as a way of distancing oneself from truth
in its "purest," most immediate form. From this perspective, the act of
self-reflection is more akin to an interference with, than a clarification of
truth. Like other meddlesome "afterthoughts," it is suspect. The
possibility that the initial shock of an event or the initial condition of the
perceiver may have distorted the initially proffered account thus becomes
highly counter-intuitive.
Yet, studies have shown that there are occasions when an assumption
in favor of an initial version of events may not be reliable. For example,
it is not uncommon for victims of post-traumatic-stress syndrome to distort
their initial accounts of spousal violence against them. Moreover, women
who experience rape or other forms of abuse frequently are reluctant to
7. Sally E. Merry, Culture, Power, and the Discourse of Law, 37 N.Y.L. SCH.L.
REv. 209, 209 (1992).
8. Kim L. Scheppele, Just the Facts Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary
Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rnv. 123 (1992).
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discuss these experiences. Self-blame and self-deception, fear of the
consequences of disclosure, and a deep sense of shame are common
obstacles to such disclosure. In situations like these, subsequent reflection
upon the triggering events, sometimes with the aid of psychotherapy, may
be precisely what is needed for the victim to overcome the social, cultural,
and psychological barriers that may initially silence her or produce an
initially unreliable account.
Professor Martha Fineman shows us something similar in her article
by bringing to our attention how contemporary legal stories about the
family are being created and deployed as society casts about for a revised
understanding of what the family is and what it is we expect of the "good"
mother or father.9 These stories, Fineman points out, tell us a good deal

about ourselves and the society we live in. For example, she states that
while "the dominant spousal story for the past decade has been one of
equality ..
, there continues to be great gender inequality in the
allocation of the burdens and costs associated with reproduction."10 One
begins to suspect that the stories that lawyers and judges sometimes like
to tell about these matters might well be fabulations reproduced by a
dominant form of discourse. These are myths we live by-regardless (or
perhaps because) of the empirical observations that they may occlude.
Professors Anthony Amsterdam and Randy Hertz show in their
contribution how popular myths, metaphors, and story forms, among other
rhetorical and linguistic devices, can be used in the closing arguments of
a criminal case to construct two strikingly different versions of reality. "
Here we see how disparate legal stories not only present radically different
accounts of the' same events, but also how they play upon different belief
systems in shaping their audience's response. For example, the
prosecutor's closing argument constructs a straightforward account of a
premeditated murder in which the "obvious" facts of a past event, the
actual shooting, combine with applicable rules of law to require the guilty
verdict. By contrast, the defense attorney's account tells a story that
enfolds the jury in the open-ended real time of trial. It is a tale plotted
around the story of the hero sworn to uphold an oath. The juror-hero is
thus covertly invited to work through at trial his or her sworn duty to keep
the government to its burden of establishing proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Faced with such a dire crime, a homicide, the jurors will be sorely
tested. But the fractured facts regarding premeditation invite the jurors to
opt for no conviction except that about which they can feel certain. In
9. Martha A. Fineman, LegalStories, Change, and Incentive-Reinforcing the Law
of the Father, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 227 (1992).
10. Id. at 228.
11. Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to
a Jury, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 55 (1992).
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short, manslaughter, not murder, is the appropriate verdict. Unlike the
prosecutor's clean and orderly narrative world, the defense has constructed
a reality in which the jurors, facing severe and perhaps even disorienting
factual ambiguity, can safely and honorably arrive at a point of
closure-if, in heroic fashion, they close around the sacred oath that they
have sworn to uphold.
In the course of their analysis, Amsterdam and Hertz show us that
significant differences in grammar, stock scripts, metaphor, and mythic
thematization directly inform and shape the two attorneys' efforts to
accomplish their respective objectives. The disparate narratives that the
attorneys use in their closing arguments before the jury make vivid the
multiple and complex ways in which human cognition operates and how
thoughts and beliefs can be influenced.
In her examination of a simulated episode of informal advocacy
between a government official and an attorney in a salary garnishment
case, Professor Peggy Davis weaves together several of the themes
mentioned above." For one thing, Davis reveals the semiotic complexity
of legal narrative and how the reality it constructs, and the way in which
it does this, reflects both the narrator's and the intended listener's social
roles and objectives. For example, Davis describes an advocate's narrative
that is careful not only to present his client's trouble, but also to integrate
that story into another story about a government official working hard in
a beleaguered agency that has been charged with a worthy mission. Here
we see the attorney's description of the consequences for her client of
"financial distress and garnishment with its sequelae of firing,
irremediable unemployment, and deepening debt"13 being deftly
interwoven with a standing invitation for the official to take on the
sympathetic character that the advocate's script has cast for her. Will she
become the hero who will rescue the client from his awful plight?
The questions that these articles raise and the insights they may
provide concerning how meaning is constructed in the everyday practices
of law are made possible, I believe, by a significant shift in mainstream
and legal culture. Some commentators have called this shift the
"interpretive turn" or the advent of "postmodernism." Regardless of the
label one chooses, however, it has become increasingly clear that we live
in an age in which, to quote Jerome Bruner, there is "a quickened [sense]
of the importance of explicit awareness, of consciousness, of the dangers
of hidden agendas[.] We would do better, we now think, to replace id
with ego, ritual with choice, to go 'meta' in general." 4 This view
12. Peggy C. Davis, Law andLawyering:Legal Studies with an Interactive Focus,
37 N.Y.L. ScHI. L. Rnv. 185 (1992).
13. Id. at 192.
14. Jerome Bruner, On Making It Strange Again, Opening Lecture of the
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suggests that we no longer enjoy the illusion of choicelessness, at least not
to the extent we once did, as more and more putatively "self-evident"
truths, the products of engrained habits of perception, thought, feeling,
and belief yield up their constructed nature to critical reflection. In his
article for this volume, cultural and cognitive anthropologist Richard
Shweder situates this new perspective in a broader context. 5 Shweder's
discussion explicitly takes note of the multicultural world that
technological advances in communication and the mass media have set
before us.
Professor Shweder uses wit and irony to highlight the strange
confusions-consider the Japanese image of Christmas as "Santa Claus
nailed to the cross" 16--begotten by cultural familiarity that may be wider
than it is deep. Shweder is amusing here, but he is making some profound
points. One question his article raises concerns the broader implications
of "going meta." As paradigms for meaning proliferate, as we begin to
see more and more possibilities for making meaning, with some meanings
and acts of meaning appearing rather starkly unfamiliar, the question of
authority inevitably arises. Simply put, whose paradigm for constructing
meaning do we (should we) authorize, under what circumstances?
Proposed answers to this question in fields such as sociology or
anthropology may tell us something significant about a specific culture or
sub-culture. But in law we know that an authoritative response can be
enforced by the police. Clearly, when it comes to preferred legal meanings
the stakes are more than academic.
To conclude these prefatory remarks, I submit that the articles in this
volume provide a fresh approach to what law is and where it can be
found. They suggest that law's domain includes, but also reaches beyond,
the realms of judicial discourse, legislative or regulatory enactment, and
academic debate. Law's force can be felt wherever lawyers, officials, and
lay people confront or anticipate legal issues and conflicts. As I will set
out in further detail in the introductory article that follows, it may well be
that we are now coming to see that law and society, psyche and culture,
legal consciousness and social consciousness, are inter-penetrating and coconstitutive. To find out how and to what extent this is so, to explore how
legal meanings shift or remain stable from one local context to another,
we need to take a closer look at what makes up the law. Thus, the authors
of the articles in this volume invite us to ask: What social scripts, stock
stories, stereotypes, myths, metaphors, and other cognitive or linguistic
representations, have been or are being used in legal narratives and
Lawyering Theory Colloquium at New York University School of Law 3 (Spring 1991)
(transcript on file with author).
15. Richard Shweder, The Authority of Voice, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 251 (1992).
16. Id. at 254.
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discourse to stimulate and justify belief in, or rejection of, particular facts
and judgments in particular contexts? Lawyering theory, at least at this
initial stage in its development, may be viewed as an effort to surface the
linguistic and cognitive tools and assumptions that legal and lay actors use
in their everyday practices within, or in contemplation of entering, the
legal system. Hopefully, these microanalytic local studies of everyday
legal practices will increase our awareness of the relationship between
what we focus on and think about when it comes to law and the legal
system, and what we focus and think with.
Before closing, I want to take this opportunity to express my warm
thanks to Tony Amsterdam, Jerry Bruner, Peggy Davis, Martha Fineman,
Sally Merry, Gus Newman, Kellis Parker, Kim Scheppele, and Richard
Shweder for their participation in the Lawyering Theory Symposium that
was held at The New York Law School on March 6, 1992. I also wish to
express my deep gratitude to the authors who contributed to this volume.
Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the help of the editors of the New York
Law School Law Review in putting together this symposium issue.
RIcHARD K. SHERWIN*
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